出国留学首选一诺留学

　　香港——一个客户在最后时刻取消一笔大订单后，德国高科技公司爱思强(Aixtron)的股价迅速下滑。

　　Months later, with the stock still reeling, a Chinese investor agreed to buy the company.

　　数月后，在其股价依然萎靡不振之际，一个中国投资者同意买下公司。

　　If only it were as simple as smart deal-making.

　　如果此事真是这么简单，只是有人做出了明智的交易决策就好了。

　　Financial filings and public statements indicate a web of relationships among the customer, thebuyer and the Chinese state.

　　然而，根据提交给金融监管机构的文件及该公司公告显示，那名客户、买家与中国政府之间存在一个关系网。

　　The links highlight the blurred lines between increasingly acquisitive Chinese companies andBeijing’s long-term industrial policy.

　　这种关联，突显出胃口越来越大的中国企业和北京的长期产业政策之间颇为模糊的界限。

　　The Aixtron case makes it very clear: It is not regular investment that is at work here, saidSebastian Heilmann, president of the Mercator Institute for China Studies, a think tank based inBerlin.

　　爱思强的例子非常清晰地表明：这并不是常规的投资，在位于柏林的智库墨卡托中国研究中心(MercatorInstitute for China Studies) 担任主管的韩博天(Sebastian Heilmann)说。

　　Instead, we see governmental-program capital working behind the scenes.

　　相反，我们看到受政府控制的资本在幕后发挥着作用。

　　Chinese leaders have made clear their intention of using state funds to acquire technologicalcapabilities overseas and bring them home, and a series of purchases in recent years havehighlighted that strategy.

　　中国领导人表明了利用国家基金获取并引入海外技术能力的意图。近年来的一系列收购也突显了这一策略。

　　That has led to questions about how to treat bids that cross between private investment andstate-orchestrated takeovers. It has also fed into broader suspicions about the fate of thetakeover targets, and whether national champions will ultimately be absorbed into the supplychain in China.

　　这引发了一个问题：如果要约既涉及私人投资，又涉及由政府策划的收购，该如何对待?它还引发了关于收购目标未来命运如何的疑问，以及这些全国性龙头企业最终是否会被纳入中国供应链。

　　Aixtron — one of a growing number of European businesses with cutting-edge technologiesthat have recently been targeted by a surge in Chinese overseas investment — provides a casestudy.

　　近年来，随着中国在海外掀起投资热潮，越来越多拥有尖端技术的欧洲企业成了它的目标。作为其中一员，爱思强提供了一个可资研究的案例。

　　A university spinoff, it employs hundreds of highly skilled engineers and has a decades-longhistory of making the advanced tools needed to make semiconductors.

　　作为大学衍生企业，爱思强雇用了数百名技能高超的工程师，在生产制造半导体所需先进工具方面拥有数十年经验。

　　Its systems can deposit layers of chemicals just atoms thick that grow the crystals needed tomake chips and light-emitting diodes.

　　它的系统可以让化学品进行原子层沉积，由此生成的晶体是生产芯片和发光二极管的必需品。

　　It was facing a broad slowdown in demand in 2015 when San’an Optoelectronics, based in theeastern Chinese city of Xiamen, canceled a large order at the last minute.

　　在2015年，中国东部城市厦门的三安光电公司在最后时刻撤销了一笔大订单，这让爱思强遭遇了需求全面下降的状况。

　　The decision sent Aixtron’s share price crashing.

　　这个决定导致爱思强的股价大幅下挫。

　　By May of this year, it had agreed to sell itself to a Chinese investment fund, Fujian Grand Chip.

　　到了今年5月，它接受了中国投资基金福建宏芯的收购要约。

　　Yet in a twist that shows the conflicting interests that can lurk behind Chinese deals, San’anhas a number of connections to Fujian Grand Chip, including a common investor and anexisting financial relationship.

　　不过，三安光电和福建宏芯有许多关联，其中牵涉到一名共同投资人和一种既有的财务关系。这显示了牵涉中国的交易背后，常常隐藏着利益冲突。

　　Fujian Grand Chip is 51 percent controlled by Liu Zhendong, a businessman the MercatorInstitute said most likely had government connections but was otherwise hard to track.

　　商人刘振东持有福建宏芯51%的股份。墨卡托中心称其极可能和政府有瓜葛，但这一点难以追查。

　　The rest is held by Xiamen Bohao, a local government investment fund that itself has links toSan’an.

　　受控于当地政府的投资基金厦门博灏持有其余的股份，它本身和三安光电有关。

　　A financial filing showed that at the end of 2014, San’an owed Bohao 300 million renminbi, nowworth about $45 million.

　　提交给金融监管部门的一份文件显示，2014年底，三安光电欠厦门博灏3亿元人民币，约合现在的4500万美元。

　　The following year, another filing showed Bohao owed San’an 240 million renminbi.

　　次年另一份文件显示，厦门博灏欠三安光电2.4亿元人民币。

　　While there is no explanation given for the fund flows, they appear to be related to financingprovided to San’an by Bohao.

　　尽管文件未对上述资金流动做出说明，但它们似乎和厦门博灏为三安光电提供资金支持有关。